Institutional Ownership, Newly Appointed CEO, and Dividend Initiation by Setiawan, Rahmat & Pradana, Erry Wisudawan




Institutional Ownership, Newly Appointed CEO,  
and Dividend Initiation 
 
Rahmat Setiawan*, Erry Wisudawan Pradana 
 
Airlangga University, Surabaya, East Java, Indonesia 
 
 
A R T I C L E  I N F O  
Article history: 
Received 28 June 2019 
Revised 21 January 2020 
Accepted 31 January 2020  
 
JEL Classification: 
G32, G35, O16, N25 
 








 A B S T R A C T  
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of institutional ownership on 
dividend initiation with newly appointed CEO holding a role as a moderating variable 
in non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. This research 
used a logistic regression model and Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA). The 
data were obtained from the public company's Financial Report and Annual Report 
published in the 2012-2017 period. Dividend initiation is the dependent variable 
measured using dummy variable, and institutional ownership is the independent 
variable proxied by the percentage of shares held by institutional investors. Newly 
appointed CEO is the moderating variable. The result shows that institutional 
ownership has a significant positive effect on dividend initiation and the newly 
appointed CEO strengthens the positive effect of institutional ownership on dividend 
initiation. It is advisable that the companies should improve their corporate 
governance’s quality by increasing the degree on institutional ownership. 
 
 A B S T R A K  
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menguji pengaruh kepemilikan institusional terhadap 
inisiasi pembayaran dividen dengan variabel moderasi newly appointed CEO pada 
perusahaan non-keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Penelitian ini 
menggunakan model regresi logistik dan Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA). Data 
diperoleh dari laporan keuangan dan laporan tahunan perusahaan yang dipublikasikan 
pada periode 2012-2017. Variabel dependen dalam penelitian ini adalah inisiasi 
pembayaran dividen yang diukur dengan menggunakan variabel dummy. Variabel 
independen yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah kepemilikan institusional yang 
diproksikan dengan persentase saham yang dimiliki oleh investor institusi, sedangkan 
variabel moderasi menggunakan newly appointed CEO. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan 
bahwa kepemilikan institusional berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap inisiasi 
pembayaran dividen dan newly appointed CEO memperkuat pengaruh positif 
kepemilikan institusional terhadap inisiasi pembayaran dividen. Oleh karena itu, 
perusahaan disarankan untuk meningkatkan kualitas tata kelola perusahaan mereka 




Technological development and economic 
integration in the current era of globalization 
provide investors with easier access to the capital 
market. This condition could be a catalyst in 
improving the in-vestment climate in the capital 
market so that the investors have more widely open 
opportunities to invest their funds in securities 
issued by companies. One of the security types that 
investors can choose as a medium of investment in 
their portfolio is stocks. 
 
Investors will expect a higher return than the 
sacrifices that they have incurred when investing 
their funds. In the perspective of shareholders, a 
dividend is a form of investment return besides 
capital gain. According to Ambarwati (2010), 
dividends are payments made by a firm to the 
shareholders derived from the firm’s earnings. 
Therefore, a firm's dividend policy is an essential 
consideration for investors to determine where they 
have to invest their money.  
* Corresponding author, email address: rahmatsetiawan@feb.unair.ac.id 
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In general, shareholders prefer a stable 
dividend payment because it can reduce the 
uncertainty they are facing. It will also increase their 
trust in the company. However, not all companies 
distribute dividends regularly every year. It is due 
to there being no rules that stipulate the necessity of 
dividend distribution. And neither is there specific 
guidelines regarding the proper amount of dividend 
which have to be paid by the firms to the 
shareholders. In addition, each firm management 
also has its own consideration before distributing 
their dividends such as the need to withhold profits 
for reinvestment, firm’s liquidity requirements, 
funding for growth opportunities, shareholder 
preferences, and various other factors related to 
dividend policy (Brigham & Houston, 2013). 
One crucial explanation about dividend as 
based on agency theory is that dividends are the 
result of agency costs and conflicts of interest be-
tween the company owner and management (Smith, 
Pennathur & Marcinciak, 2017). Agency relation 
arises when one or more individuals as principals 
employ other individuals (agents) to act on their 
behalf and delegate power to these agents to make a 
strategic decision in a company. 
Jensen (1986) proposed that management in 
nature will not share profits in the form of cash to 
investors without being forced to do so. This is due 
to the separation between ownership and 
management of listed companies which makes 
managers tend to fulfil their own personal interests 
and override the shareholders’ wealth. Dividend 
payment could reduce excess cash under 
management's control so it can minimize 
unnecessary cash expenditure and create 
disciplinary control over managers (Easter-brook, 
1984). 
Previous studies such as Hu & Kumar (2004), 
Bhattacharya, Li & Rhee (2016), and Amina (2015) 
examined the issue of dividend that generally 
discusses Dividend Payout Ratio. It is the proportion 
of net income distributed as dividends to 
shareholders. This type of issue is relatively 
common discussed in various literature so that there 
is a lack of novelty and development on an academic 
point of view. This research tries to focus on the 
dividend initiation case that is still rarely studied in 
Indonesia. 
The fundamental difference between dividend 
initiation and the other types of dividend payment 
lies on the fact that the firm distributes cash 
dividends after not paying a dividend in an 
extended period. In this case, a firm can be classified 
as dividend initiator if they do not distribute their 
dividends to its shareholders for the previous three 
years in a row. 
Based on the data on Figure 1 which is compiled 
and processed from the Kustodian Sentral Efek 
Indonesia (KSEI) website, it is known that 66 non-
financial companies listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange initiate dividend payments during the 
peri-od of 2013 to 2017. In 2013, it was the year with 
the highest number of dividend initiators, namely 




Figure 1.  
Number of dividend initiator in non-financial firms 
listed on IDX for the 2013-2017 period 
 
Institutional ownership is one of the tools that 
can be used to reduce agency costs and increase the 
percentage overtime (Aguilar, 2013). Institutional 
ownership is the ownership of shares owned by 
investors in the form of institution. High 
institutional ownership structure will cause more 
intensive monitoring efforts towards management 
because institutional investors have adequate 
professional-ism and resources in analyzing 
information. Institutional ownership also represents 
a source of power that can be used to either support 
or oppose manager's policies (Burns, Kedia, & 
Lipson, 2010), including policies regarding dividend 
initiation. 
According to the data compiled from the 
companies’ financial statements, the share 
ownership in Indonesia is still dominated by 
institutional investors compared to individual 
investors. This phenomenon shows an increasing 
trend during the period 2012-2016 with the average 
percentage of institutional ownership in non-
financial companies listed on IDX ranging from 
57.50% up to 61.03%. 
The relationship of institutional ownership on 
dividend initiation for a company is also determined 
by the characteristic of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO). Newly appointed CEO or CEO who is fairly 
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new in occupying his position is associated with low 
managerial power (O'Reilly III & Main, 2010). 
Therefore, the new CEO tends to act in accordance 
with the shareholders’ interest because s/he still 
does not have sufficient power. Based on the 
research by Smith et al. (2017), conducted in the 
United States, CEOs who have just been appointed 
in companies with high level of institutional owner-
ship will have a greater tendency to initiate dividend 
than those who have had a longer term of tenure. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HY-
POTHESES 
Several previous studies tried to explain about the 
initiation of dividend payments (Jin, 2000; Lee & 
Mauck, 2016; Officer, 2011; Smith et al., 2017). Smith 
et al. (2017) describe the issue regarding dividend 
initiation using logistic regression analysis. This 
research was held in the United States using samples 
of non-financial companies that had been gone 
public in the period 2003-2012. It was stated that the 
aspects of corporate governance covering 
institutional ownership, independent 
commissioners, and shareholder rights had a 
significant positive effect on dividend initiation. 
Another study by Officer (2011) on dividend 
initiation associated with corporate governance and 
overinvestment. This study used 1, 283 observations 
of companies announcing dividend initiation on the 
NYSE, Nasdaq, or Amex during the period 1963-
2008. It was found that companies with high cash 
flows and low Tobin's Q have a higher return on the 
announcement of dividend initiation than the other 
companies. This evidence indicates that the agency 
cost reduction through dividend initiation is 
reflected in a higher return. It can prevent the 
behavior of overinvestment by managers in 
companies that have low investment opportunities.  
Also, a study that reviews the topic of dividend 
initiation was conducted by Fargher & Weigand 
(2009). They examined cross-sectional differences in 
terms of earnings, returns, and risks of market-to-
book ratio at the time before and after dividend 
initiation activities in the United States during the 
period 1964-2000. This study used parametric and 
non-parametric statistics and ordinary least squares 
regression to test the research hypothesis. They 
found that stocks that had a low market-to-book 
ratio showed the most favourable price reaction to 
the announcement of the dividend initiation. 
However, the firms with high market-to-book ratio 
characteristics have higher profits, cash levels, and 
capital expenditure before the dividend initiation 
compared to after the dividend initiation activities. 
Dividend Initiation 
Dividend initiation is the first dividend payment 
activity carried out by the company after not having 
paid dividends a few years before. This is primarily 
a firm that can be classified as dividend initiator if 
they do not distribute dividends to their 
shareholders for the previous three years in a row 
(Smith et al., 2017). Asquith & Mullins (1983) stated 
that dividend initiation reflects a significant shift in 
the firm's dividend policy because it describes a 
change in dividends payout from zero to become a 
positive value. 
The policy of initiating dividend taken by a firm 
has the consequence of financial responsibility that 
is quite fundamental and sticky. When a company 
decides to start paying a dividend again, they are 
required to be able to maintain the consistency of 
such dividend payments periodically in the future. 
The dividend initiation can also be used as a signal 
for investors regarding two things: (i) dividend 
initiation reflects higher cash flows and profitability 
in the future; and (ii) dividend initiation indicates 
lower agency cost at the initiator firms because the 
manager will have less free cash flow so the 
probability of expropriation and overinvestment 
traits can be suppressed (Officer, 2011). 
 
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Dividend 
Initiation 
Institutional ownership is a condition where the 
institution participates in the company’s share 
ownership (Widarjo, 2010). This institution can be in 
the form of government, private, domestic or foreign 
institutions. 
In accordance with agency theory, conflicts 
between managers and shareholders will cause 
agency costs that can be detrimental to shareholders. 
Jensen (1986) stated in the free cash flow hypothesis 
that dividend payments to shareholders could 
reduce agency costs because excess cash under 
management's control becomes limited. Given that 
managers basically prefer to save surplus cash 
rather than pay dividends, Fama & Jensen (1983) 
emphasizes the importance of oversight 
mechanisms in the firm. One of the oversight 
mechanisms is by activating the monitoring role 
through institutional investors. 
Institutional investors have advantages in terms 
of monitoring to create a transparent environment 
compared to individual investors because they have 
more adequate resources. Institutional investors are 
also associated as large institutions with 
sophisticated skills that make it possible to gather 
valuable and relevant information. This makes 
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institutional investors able more carefully to invest 
their funds (Gul, Kim, & Qiu, 2010). 
The presence of institutional ownership can 
reduce asymmetry information between managers 
and shareholders through the quality improvement 
of corporate governance. When the level of 
asymmetry information can be minimized, the 
potential of opportunistic behavior and the act of 
expropriation by managers is diminished. As an 
implication, there will be disciplinary control for the 
management, so the substantial cash flow, which is 
actually the right of investors, is also increasingly 
protected. 
Dividend payment can provide more certainty 
for institutional investors, and it is required as 
compensation for the monitoring activities they 
have carried out. Therefore, institutional investors 
prefer the firms paying dividend compared to those 
that are not paying a dividend (Grinstein & 
Michaely, 2005).  
Some previous empirical research, such as 
Short, Zhang & Keasey (2002); Abdelsalam, El-Masry 
& Elsegini (2008); Rajput & Jhunjhunwala (2019);Al-
Najjar  &  Kilincarlsan  (2016); Jory, Ngo & Sakaki 
(2017); Huda & Abdullah (2013); Liljeblom & Maury 
(2015); Crane, Michenaud & Wes (2016); Roy (2015); 
Isakov & Weisskopf (2015), documented the positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and 
dividend policy. This study then supports this 
stream and proposes that a good quality of corporate 
governance through institutional ownership 
monitoring activities will lead to a higher propensity 
of a firm's dividend initiation.  
 
H1:  Institutional ownership has a positive effect on 
dividend initiation. 
 
Moderating Effect of Newly Appointed CEO on 
Institutional Ownership—Dividend Initiation 
Relationship 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or in Indonesia, well 
known as the president director, is the highest 
position in the executive ranks. The CEO is 
appointed and dismissed by the approval of the 
shareholders General Meeting SGM). The SGM 
member who has the authority can propose the CEO 
candidate who will be appointed to lead the 
company. 
Newly appointed CEO is a CEO who is 
relatively new in occupying his position in a 
company. Hambrick & Mason (1984) argue that CEO 
tenure is one of the critical factors that can explain 
the results of a CEO's decision making. A source of 
the power of a CEO could come from the tenure that 
has been passed. The shorter tenure of the CEO is, 
the weaker the managerial power is. This makes 
newly appointed CEOs tend to be more lenient and 
more easily influenced by shareholders who want 
the dividend initiation (Smith et al., 2017). 
On the contrary, influential owners can 
influence a firm's strategic policy through their 
authority in selecting board members and ability to 
proposing CEO succession. The proportion of 
institutional ownership has increased over time and 
plays a vital role in corporate governance (Aguilar, 
2013). In general, institutional investors have a large 
proportion of share ownership in a company. Large 
amounts of stock ownership make institutional 
investors able to demand dividend initiation 
through their influence in determining CEO 
turnover. 
The influence of institutional investors on 
demanding the initiation of dividend payments is 
more substantial when the company is led by newly 
appointed CEOs. This is due to the situation where 
there is an imbalanced power between institutional 
investors and newly appointed CEOs as associated 
with their weak managerial power. This is in line 
with research conducted by Smith et al. (2017). 
Therefore, the hypothesis can be proposed as the 
following. 
 
H2:  Newly appointed CEO strengthens the positive 
effect of institutional ownership on dividend 
initiation.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
This study uses a quantitative approach and logistic 
regression techniques for compiling the prediction 
models. The sample was chosen by purposive 
sampling method by applying some specific criteria: 
1. Non-financial companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange during the 2012-2017 
period. 
2. Companies which report their Financial Report 
using Indonesian Rupiah (IDR). 
3. Firms must have complete data regarding the 
variables used in this research. 
Therefore, the samples include 244 non-
financial companies listed on IDX during 2012-2017. 
The researchers conducted a test for the 
hypothesis with measurable data to get the general 
inference. This research uses IBM SPSS Statistics 25 
for Windows as a statistical tool. 
 
  




This research uses a logistic regression model and 
Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA). To address 
the research question, the researchers use the 




DIVINi,t =  β0 + β1 INSTOWNi,t-1 + β2 LEVi,t-1 + β3 ROAi,t-1 + β4 SIZEi,t-1 + εi,t 
 
Model 2 
DIVINi,t = β0 + β1 INSTOWNi,t-1 + β2 NEWCEOi,t-1 + β3(INSTOWN*NEWCEO)i,t-1 + β4 LEVi,t-1 + β5ROAi,t-1 
+ β6SIZEi,t-1 + εi,t  
 
DIVIN would be a dummy variable equal to one 
of the firm initiated dividends in the current year. 
Following Setiawan & Syarif (2019), INSTOWN is 
the percentage of institutional ownership which 
measure by the ratio of shares owned by 
institutional investors-to-total outstanding shares. 
To test for CEO power, we use NEWCEO, a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the CEO is in the first or second 
year of tenure. 
To test the moderating role of newly appointed 
CEO, the researchers use the interaction term, 
NEWCEO*INSTOWN by multiplying NEWCEO and 
INSTOWN. The researchers also use firm’s 
characteristics as control variables, i.e. LEV was 
measured with total debt divided by the total assets 
of the firm, SIZE proxied by the natural log of the 
firm's total assets, and ROA as the proxied of 
profitability. ROA was measured with net income 
divided by total assets of the firm. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The objects of this research for the samples were 244 
non-financial companies selected based on the 
criteria with the number of observations (N) of 774 
during the five years of the study. Table 1 shows the 




 N Min Max Mean SD 
DIVIN 774 0.0000 1.0000 0.0850 0.2790 
INSTOWN (%) 774 0.0000 99.6900 59.7650 20.5320 
NEWCEO 774 0.0000 1.0000 0.1510 0.3580 
LEV (%) 774 0.0300 157.1100 50.6580 21.0130 
ROA (%) 774 -71.1300 45.7900 4.1570 8.5930 
SIZE 774 23.39000 33.2000 28.3290 1.6140 
 
 
The dividend initiation variable (DIVIN) has 
Mean of 0.0853, which means there are 8.53% of firms 
from all observations that do dividend initiation 
activity. The institutional ownership variable 
(INSTOWN) has Mean showing a value of 59.7653%, 
which means that the average proportion of share 
ownership held by institutional shareholders in non-
financial companies in Indonesia during the study 
amounted to 59.7653%. This data shows that the 
percentage of institutional ownership is relatively 
large. The variable of newly appointed CEO 
(NEWCEO) has a Maximum value of 1 which means 
the CEO is classified as new in occupying his/her 
position because s/he still has tenure for less than two 
years. Furthermore, this variable has Mean of 0.1512, 
which means there are 15.12% of the CEOs of the 
company from all observations classified as newly 
appointed CEO. 
 










 INSTOWN NEWCEO LEV ROA SIZE 
INSTOWN 1.0000     
NEWCEO -0.1760 1.0000    
LEV 0.1220 -0.4700 1.0000   
ROA -0.0060 -0.0720 -0.2810 1.0000  
SIZE -0.0570 0.0820 0.2020 0.1160 1.000 
 
Table 3 
Logistic regression analysis 
 DIVIN 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Intercept -3.0490 (0.2160) 
-2.4030 
(0.4250) 
INSTOWN  0.0230** (0.0010) 
0.0170* 
(0.0660) 
NEWCEO  -0.7150 (0.5410) 
INSTOWN*NEWCEO  0.0400* (0.0240) 
LEV -0.0170* (0.0160) 
-0.0140** 
(0.0470) 
ROA 0.0480*** (0.0040) 
0.0560*** 
(0.0010) 
SIZE -0.0100 (0.9090) 
-0.0490 
(0.582) 
Observation 774 774 
Pseudo R-Square 0.0830 0.1860 
*    Significance at 10% level 
**  Significance at 5% level 
*** Significance at 1% level 
 
Based on Table 3, the results of logistic regression 
analysis in model 1 and model 2 find that institutional 
ownership has a significant positive effect on 
dividend initiation. The result of these two models 
indicates that higher institutional ownership, the 
more likely the firm initiates dividend. 
Institutional ownership plays a vital role in 
minimizing agency conflicts that occur between 
managers and shareholders. The existence of 
institutional investors is considered an effective 
monitoring mechanism in the decision-making 
process by managers (Jensen, 1986). The more 
substantial institutional ownership in a firm will 
drive a better supervising on manager’s traits, so it 
will have an impact on the potential reduction of 
manager's opportunistic behavior. 
Institutional investors will also expect incentives 
in the form of dividend payments for monitoring 
activities they have carried out. Returns in the form of 
dividends are preferred because they provide high 
certainty than capital gains. This result is in line with 
the first hypothesis that institutional ownership has a 
significant positive effect on dividend initiation, as 
also stated by Smith et al. (2017). 
The result of logistic regression analysis is about 
newly appointed CEO as a moderating variable. 
Table 3 has a significant positive value. The 
regression result shows that newly appointed CEOs 
strengthen the positive effect of institutional 
ownership on dividend initiation. It implies that the 
positive effect of institutional ownership on dividend 
initiation will be more substantial when the company 
is led by a CEO who is still relatively new in 
occupying his/her position. 
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The term of tenure provides an opportunity for 
the CEO to invest his/her power in the company 
where they lead. Tenure makes it easier for CEOs to 
create good narratives to pursue personal interests 
under the pretext that he has a good experience and 
strong network, understands all resources, well in-
formed about firm’s business environment, and 
knows what is best for the company (Brown & Lee, 
2010). Therefore, the newly appointed CEO is 
associated with lower managerial power. This makes 
them take action in accordance with the interests of 
the company owner, and it is easier to influence them. 
CEO, as the company’s top executive, has a vital 
role in the company's dividend payment activities. 
The CEO’s involvement in the dividend policy begins 
when the board of directors proposes interim 
dividends. According to the Indonesia Limited 
Liability Company Law (Undang-Undang Perseroan 
Terbatas) Number 40 of 2007, the distribution of 
interim dividends is determined based on the 
decision of the board of directors after obtaining 
board of commissioners' approval. The interim 
dividend serves as the basis for determining the final 
dividend, which will be discussed at the General 
Meeting of Shareholders. 
Institutional investors are generally powerful 
shareholders because of their large proportion of 
share ownership. The company owners with a strong 
characteristic of power can influence the company's 
strategic policy through their authority in proposing 
CEO succession. Moreover, the newly appointed 
CEO is associated with weaker managerial power. 
Because of this imbalanced power, institutional 
investors will press the newly appointed CEO to 
initiate dividend payments by relying on their ability 
to influence CEO turnover. This is consistent with the 
results of a study conducted by Smith et al. (2017). It 
also supports this study’s second hypothesis stating 
that newly appointed CEOs strengthen the positive 
influence of institutional ownership on the firm's 
dividend initiation policy. It can also be said that the 
positive influence of institutional ownership on 
dividend initiation is stronger for companies led by 
new CEOs than those led by CEOs with longer 
tenure. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
This study attempts to highlight the issue of 
dividend initiation in Indonesia during the period 
2012 until 2017. The majority of existing empirical 
studies only focus on the effect of ownership 
structure or board composition on a firm's dividend 
policy as reflected by Dividend Payout Ratio. Unlike 
the topic mentioned earlier, the relationship 
explanation be-tween corporate governance and 
dividend initiation seems has insufficient attention. 
Besides that, it is still very rarely discussed in the 
financial management discipline nowadays. 
 This research objective is to discuss a firm's 
dividend initiation activity when viewed from the 
perspective of agency theory by linking it with the 
corporate governance mechanism and CEO 
characteristic. This study also proposes an issue 
development by including the newly appointed 
CEO as moderating variable on dividend initiation 
and finally tries to obtain empirical evidence from 
this research. 
This research contributes to the financial 
management literature through two things: (1) 
explain the influence of corporate governance 
proxied by institutional ownership on dividend 
initiation, in which, this theme still get less attention 
in the financial sector. (2) provides an element of 
novelty by presenting the moderating variable of 
CEO tenure, which portrays one of the CEO's 
personal attributes. This can affect his/her approach 
to the decision-making process. Those two 
contributions are expected to fulfil the research gap 
from the previous studies and could give a new 
insight with also a more comprehensive explanation 
about the firm's dividend initiation activity. 
The study showed that dividend initiation 
mostly occurs in the firm with strong corporate 
governance. Firms with higher institutional 
ownership are more likely to initiate dividends 
because institutional investors could decrease the 
level of agency cost through its monitoring function. 
Therefore, institutional ownership has a positive 
effect on dividend initiation. 
The newly appointed CEO variable strengthens 
the positive effect of institutional ownership on 
dividend initiation. Newly appointed CEO has a 
greater tendency to meet shareholders' interest (i.e., 
in this case, is to initiate dividend). It happened 
because the new CEO is easier to be influenced by 
powerful principals so that it will cause an 
alignment effect.  
In terms of the effects, the control variables have 
some features. For example, leverage has a negative 
effect on dividend initiation; profitability has a 
positive effect on dividend initiation, while firm size 
has no effect on dividend initiation. 
It is advisable that the companies should 
improve their corporate governance’s quality by 
increasing the degree on institutional ownership. By 
doing so, they can lead to a higher probability of 
dividend initiation. Moreover, this study is very 
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beneficial for the shareholders on helping them to 
understand how CEOs would behave according to 
their attribute in the context of the decision making 
process. For further research, the researchers can 
identify other variables (for example, board 
composition, ownership structure, or other CEO 
characteristic besides CEO tenure) that influence 
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